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The primary meaning of the word "enumeration" is a "list" or
"catalog," with a secondary meaning of a "numbering" or "counting."'
The U.S. Constitution uses the word in both senses. The decennial
census required for purposes of apportioning representatives and di-
rect taxes is actually referred to in the text as "the enumeration."2
"Enumeration" is also used in the Ninth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights to refer to rights listed elsewhere: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."2
Notwithstanding the words of the Ninth Amendment, in the Con-
stitution as originally adopted, the word "right" appears only once
and then not in the sense used in the Bill of Rights. Copyrights and
patents are described as conferring on authors and inventors "the ex-
clusive Right" to their intellectual property.4 In the amendments
added after the Bill of Rights, the word is used five times in the
phrase "the right to vote" and twice in the phrase "the right of
choice," referring to the power of the House of Representatives and
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See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 759 (1966).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner
as they shall by Law direct."); see also id- amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."); idi amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.").
3 Id. amend. IX. Perhaps the reference to rights enumerated in "the Constitution" was
adopted because many of the drafters, including Madison, expected that the amendments
would be inserted in the text, probably in Article I, Section 9, rather than appended at the end.
See I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 451-53 (J. Gales ed., 1789).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5 Id. amend. XIV, § 2 (reducing representation on account of denial of voting rights); id.
amend. XV, § I (prohibiting denial of voting rights based on race); id. amend. XIX (same con-
cerning sex); id amend. XXIV, § 1 (same concerning failure to pay poll or other tax-limited
to federal elections); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (same concerning citizens eighteen years of age or
older).
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Senate to choose a president and vice president in case no candidate
for election receives a majority of the electoral votes.6
The word "right" appears five times in the first eight amendments,
although the actual number of rights, specifically so called, is not easy
to determine. The "right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances" in the First
Amendment7 seems to be at least two rights rather than one, since the
right to assemble is not limited to assembly in connection with peti-
tioning, nor is the right to petition limited to petitioning by an as-
sembly. In addition, the right to assemble, sometimes referred to by
scholars as the "freedom of assembly," has been extended to include
a general "freedom of association."8
The "right of the people to keep and bear Arms" in the Second
Amendment9 may also be a double rather than a single right: it
seems to protect both those who keep and those who bear arms; that
is, the right seems to extend to persons who bear arms kept by others
and to persons who keep the arms borne by others. Likewise, the
Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" prohibits both unreasonable searches and unreasonable sei-
zures.'0 The Sixth Amendment clearly enumerates several distinct
clusters of rights of persons accused of crime:
the right [1] to a speedy and public trial, [2] by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and [3] to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; [4] to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; [5] to have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor, and [6] to have the assistance of counsel
for his defence.
Finally, the Seventh Amendment guarantees "the right of trial by
jury," "[i] n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars."
2
In strict Hohfeldian analysis, "right" correlates with "duty" in the
sense that the presence of a right in one party implies the presence of
6 Id. amend. XX, § 4 (superseding part of amend. XII).
7 Id. amend. I.
8 See, e.g., Henry J. Abraham, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Citizenship, in OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (Kermit L. Hall ed., Oxford
University Press 2d ed. 2005). "Freedom" may be used interchangeably with "right." See
WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 906.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
10 Id. amend. W.
1 Id. amend. VI.
12 Id. amend. VII.
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a duty in another.13 In this sense, each of the rights listed in the Bill
of Rights implies a duty on the part of the government to respect that
particular right. The Second Amendment makes the connection ob-
vious: "The right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.' ' 4 That is, the existence of the right imposes a duty on the
government not to infringe it. If rights imply duties, duties may also
imply rights. 15 In consequence, the duties in the form of prohibitions
imposed on the government by the Bill of Rights may add to the list
of rights.
The First Amendment forbids Congress from passing any law "re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 6 These
restrictions imply a right to be free from the imposition of a religious
establishment, as well as rights to, respectively, the free exercise of re-
ligion, free speech, and a free press. The Third Amendment's re-
striction on the quartering of soldiers in private houses correlates
with rights not to be subject to such impositions in times of peace
without consent and in times of war only "in a manner to be pre-
scribed by law."' 7 The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on the issu-
ance of warrants "but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized" implies one, fairly complex right.'
The Fifth Amendment-
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ex-
cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
13 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDIcIAL REASONING 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (originally published as two separate
articles: Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16
(1913); Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710 (1917))
(characterizing "right" and "duty" as 'jural correlatives"); cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural
Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) (describing a "right," in a typically trenchant phrase, as
"only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the
public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it").
14 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
15 There may be duties that do not give rise to corresponding rights of enforcement in the
public. "Political questions" have historically been regarded as nonjusticiable. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of
the separation of powers.").
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17 Id. amend. III.
18 Id. amend. IV.
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law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just corn-
. 19
pensation
-- generates a host of rights, including procedural rights of the crimi-
nally accused, against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, and of
course the rights to due process and against uncompensated gov-
ernmental takings. The Seventh Amendment safeguards the right to
trial byjury: "[N] o fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."20 And, finally, the Eighth Amendment-" [e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted"21 -correlates with rights, respectively,
to bail and against "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual punish-
ments."
A census of rights expressly so called in the Bill of Rights, while
not without difficulty, would produce a finite number. Adding rights
generated by prohibitions imposed by the amendments makes the
task more difficult. The enumeration of rights is further complicated
by the fact that the Constitution outside the Bill of Rights, while not
listing rights in that sense other than the right to vote, imposes a host
of duties in the form of prohibitions on the federal and state gov-
ernments, which if enforceable by private parties correlate with
rights. For example, Congress may not suspend the "Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus" except in military emergencies,2 and the
states may not enact legislation "impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts. 2 3 Constitutional guarantees may also generate rights. For ex-
ample, the right to travel between the states, which had been an ex-
pressly enumerated right in the Articles of Confederation,24 has been
held to be implicit in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV,
2 5
19 Id. amend. V.
20 Id, amend. VII.
21 Id. amend. VIII.
Id. art. I, § 9. "Privilege" may be used interchangeably with "right." See WEBSTER'S, supra
note 1, at 1805.
23 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. In the late nineteenth century, judicial attention shifted to the
Due Process Clauses for the guarantee of freedom of contract against impairment by the states
and the federal government. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
reasons for this shift, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two Con-
stitutional Provisions, 1 N.Y.U.J. L. & LIBERTY 370, 395-400 (2005) (noting the broader reach of
the Due Process Clauses as well as their emphasis on economic opportunity rather than vested
rights).
24 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV ("[T]he people of each State shall have free ingress
and regress to and from any other State ....").
25 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (prohibit-
ing taxation on persons traveling interstate).
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Even an express right or prohibition can cause difficulty for the
enumerator of constitutional rights, as the jurisprudence of due
process amply illustrates. In the days before the incorporation of
most of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, for exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process required more
than mere formal compliance with proper procedure. The defen-
dant in a state criminal prosecution had a federal constitutional right
26to a real trial and not a mob-dominated one. Were it not for the
subsequent history of the phrase, it would be tempting to describe
this as an example of "substantive due process," in the sense of add-
ing substance (an impartial jury) to the bare procedural requirement
of a trial. How is this right to be counted? As a separate right? As a
lesser included right in the general right to due process? Or simply
as a specific application of the general right?
Due process has also been held to imply the right to be tried by an
impartial judge, one with no "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest" in the outcome of the case.7 It is not inconceivable that the
recognition of this right is mistaken and that the drafters of the
original Due Process Clause, well aware of the partiality of royal
judges in colonial days, deliberately left this right off their list, reason-
ing that if the judiciary were corrupted, ajudicially administered rem-
edy would be useless. They certainly put their faith in the jury as a
shield against unjust judges, repeatedly guaranteeing the right to trial
by jury, a right the abuse of which is more obviously recognizable
than biased judicial rulings. The unamended Constitution provides
that the "Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury, ''2" and the Sixth Amendment expressly affirms the right to
"an impartial jury." The Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecution
"unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury," and prohib-
its a second prosecution for the same offense in case of acquittal. s
The Seventh Amendment prohibits the re-examination by judges of
facts found by a jury except "according to the rules of the common
law.'1 Or, of course, the drafters might have thought the right to an
26 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 102 (1923) (determining a trial dominated by a mob to
be a denial of due process). After incorporation, the right can be located in the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial "by an impartialjury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1928). The court noted that "[a]ll questions ofjudicial
qualification may not involve constitutional validity," and instanced "matters of kinship, per-
sonal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest." Id. Even after incorporation, it is diffi-
cult to locate the right to an impartial judge anywhere other than in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, since there is no express right to trial by an impartial judge in the
Bill of Rights.
28 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2 Id. amend. VI.
30 Id. amend. V.
31 Id. amend. VII
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impartial judge so obvious a requirement of due process that it did
not require express mention. How is this right to be counted? Is it
a distinct right, like the right to trial by an impartial jury? Or is it an-
other aspect of the general right to due process?
Further complicating the question is the fact that state constitu-
tions may include, in addition to an express right to due process, a
specific prohibition of trial by ajudge with a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the case. The North Carolina Constitution, for example,
provides-not in the Declaration of Rights, but in the Judiciary Arti-
cle-"[i]n no case shall the compensation of any Judge or Magistrate
be dependent upon his decision or upon the collection of costs.
3
Since the prohibition implies a right to an impartial judge, it would
count as an enumerated right in the state constitution, but as a right
not separately listed in the Federal Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Is the right to equal protection a right enumerated in the Consti-
tution? It appears in the form of a prohibition in the Fourteenth
Amendment, applicable to the states-"no state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 34-but
is not separately enumerated in the Bill of Rights, applicable to the
federal government. Yet in Bolling v. Sharpe,3 a companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education,36 in which the Supreme Court held that
racial segregation of public schools by the states is a violation of equal
protection, the same Court held racial segregation in public schools
in the District of Columbia a violation of due process. If this decision
is correct, it must be for some reason other than that it would be
anomalous for racial discrimination to be unconstitutional in the
states, while being constitutional in federal territories. The right to
equal protection, then, is enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment
but subsumed in the general right to due process in the Fifth
Amendment. State constitutions may, like the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, list both rights side-by-side.
32 SeeJOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 38-39 (2003) (noting the ab-
sence of a constitutional text to support this proposition in Calder v. Bull).
33 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21; seeJOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION:
A REFERENCE GUIDE 117-18 (1993) (noting that "payment by results" is now viewed as a viola-
tion of due process).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race,
color, religion, or national origin."). The law-of-the-land clause traces its antecedents back to
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At one time, it was a question of serious concern whether to list a
right to freedom of contract as an aspect of liberty (or property) pro-
tected by the general right to due process." Today the same question
arises concerning the right to privacy, 9 which itself has been held to
include the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren,40 the right of coupiles to practice birth control,4 the right of a
woman to an abortion, 4 and the right of adult homosexuals to com-
mit consensual sodomy.43 Both the outmoded freedom of contract
and the still-current right to privacy have been described as rights to
"substantive due process," rights respectively economic and non-
economic. The phrase "substantive due process," an oxymoron link-
ing substance and procedure, first appeared in a Supreme Court
opinion in 1948-in a dissenting opinion using it as a bad name to
the Magna Carta (1215) and is equivalent to the later phrase "due process of law." ORTH, supra
note 33, at 55-59.
38 For a classic analysis of the question, see Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454
(1909).
39 Phrased as the "right to be let alone," the right to privacy first appeared in a Supreme
Court opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
but seems to have originated in THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 26 (1880).
40 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (affirming the right of parents to
direct the education of children by, in this case, sending them to private rather than public
schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (finding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prevents the state from interfering with the right of parents to direct the education of
their children, or with the right of teachers to provide such instruction-in this case, foreign-
language instruction); see also ORTH, supra note 32, at 79-80 (arguing that "[iln the heyday of
economic substantive due process" these cases were addressed, "albeit with some difficulty, as
impermissible commercial regulation" of a teacher's "right to teach" and parents' right to con-
tract for teaching).
41 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the constitutional
right to privacy protects the use of birth control by married couples); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (extending the right recognized in Griswold to unmarried cou-
ples). Both cases were originally decided on grounds other than due process, Griswold on a
complicated theory of privacy protected by the "penumbras" of a variety of rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights, 381 U.S. at 484, and Eisenstadt on grounds of equal protection, 405 U.S. at
437-38, but both are now generally understood as aspects of due process.
42 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("[T]he right to privacy.., is broad enough to
cover the abortion decision .... ").
43 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overturning a law criminalizing "private
sexual conduct"). One state court has found a due process right to same-sex marriage. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the state
policy prohibiting same-sex marriage licenses lacks a rational basis); see also Opinion of the Jus-
tices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (finding that a bill allowing same-sex cou-
ples to form civil unions but prohibiting them from entering into marriage would violate the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Massachusetts Constitution); John V. Orth,
Night Thoughts: Reflections on the Debate Concerning Same-Sex Marriage, 3 NEvADA L.J. 560, 565
(2003) (illustrating different applications of equal protection and due process guarantees to the
issue of same-sex marriage).
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describe the excesses of its economic aspect." As has sometimes hap-
pened to labels in fields other than law-"baroque" in music,
"Gothic" in architecture, and "impressionism" in art-a word that be-
gan as a reproach has gradually shed its negative connotations and
developed a neutral, even a positive, meaning.
Part of the problem is terminological. The penultimate clause of
the Fifth Amendment-"nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"45-- could have become known as the Dep-
rivation Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, just as the last
clause in the Fifth Amendment-"nor shall private property be taken
for public use, withoutjust compensation"46-is known as the Takings
Clause, rather than the Private Property, Public Use, or Just Compen-
sation Clause. Thought of as the Deprivation Clause, the prohibition
would have been seen as imposing a duty on the government (the
federal government in the case of the Fifth Amendment, state gov-
ernments in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment) not to deprive a
person of fundamental rights-rights Blackstone had comprehen-
sively catalogued in 1765 as the "absolute rights of every Englishman":
life, liberty, and property47-without due process of law. The focus, in
other words, would have been on the end to be avoided as much as,
or more than, on the means to that end. This would, in fact, be in
keeping with the history of judicial interpretation of the Clause, with
its emphasis on what is taken as well as on why and how it is taken.48
A similar terminological trap lies concealed in the phrase "un-
enumerated rights." Contrasted with those rights listed (one way or
another) in the Constitution and obviously appropriate for judicial
enforcement, the term implies an addition to the constitutional text
without compliance with the amendment process spelled out in Arti-
cle V. Just as labeling some elements of due process "substantive"
serves to emphasize the procedural aspects of due process while dele-
gitimizing the non-procedural aspects, so qualifying some rights as
"unenumerated" concedes constitutional status to rights that made
the list (one way or another) while delegitimizing rights not found on
the list.
44 Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (using
the phrase with regards to a company's claimed right to natural gas in the "common reservoir").
45 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46 Id.
47 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *116, *123-36. Blackstone used the word "abso-
lute," not in the sense of "not subject to qualification," but rather in the sense of a right inher-
ing in the person, not based on contract, "good against all the world." Id.
48 See ORTH, supra note 32, at 74-75 (explaining how the focus on "taking," developed in
early economic substantive due process cases, remained influential in later "individual privacy"
cases).
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Only a relative handful of "rights" expressly so called are enumer-
ated in the Constitution. Many others, widely accepted and noncon-
troversial, appear in the text under other names, often but not always
in the form of prohibitions on legislation or government action. The
resolution of difficult questions concerning when to recognize that
government has exceeded its constitutional powers, violated prohibi-
tions placed on it by the Constitution, or transgressed rights enumer-
ated in the Constitution is not aided by the use of non-constitutional
concepts like "substantive due process" and "unenumerated rights."
The recognition of constitutional rights should not be a game of pin-
the-label-on-the-right.
